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CASE COMMENTS
ATToRNEY AND CLIENT-ATToRNEY's
ROAD. LobATION HEL

CONTRACT TO PROCURE CHANGE IN

NOT Von) AS AGAINST PUBLxo PoLicy BECAUSn OF

ATTonNEY's BEiNG STATE SnnATon.-Plaintiff, an attorney entered into a
contract with P, by the terns of which P employed plaintiff as attorney and legal adviser to represent his interest in having the location
of a state road changed. In consideration of such legal services and
other .legal advice pertaining to the matter and causing the road to be
located across the land-of P where it was most desirable and would do
the least damage to P, he agreed to convey 10 acres of land to plaintiff,
Plaintiff succeeded in having the location changed, and now seeks
specific performance of P's contract to convey the land. Defendant
urges that the contract was void as against public policy in that plaintiff was at the time a state senator from that district. Held: That the
attorney's contract was not void as against public policy merely because the attorney attempting to secure the road change was a state
senator. Parkey v. Brock, 222 Ky. 34, 299 S. W. 1061.
It Is necessary first to determine what is meant by against public
policy. It has been held that a contract which is against public policy
Is one which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against
-the public good, or if the contract binds the parties or either of them,
to do something opposed to the public policy of the state It Is illegal
and void. Kentucky Association of Highway Contractors v. Williams,
213 Ky. 167, 280 S. W. 937, 45 A. L. R. 544. This is the general rule as
set forth by the text writers. Greenhood, Public Policy, page 179, 3
Williston, Contracts, seftions 1729a, 1760, t761. Spime of the decisions of the Kentucky court Announcing this general principle are:
Gordon v. Gordon, 168 Ky. 409, 182 S. W. 220, L. R. A. 1916D, 576;
Westerfleld-Bonfe Co. v. Burnett, 176 Ky. 188, 195 S. W. 477; NortonVi4lle v. -Woodward,191 Ky. 730, 231 S. W. 224.
If it had been true as suggested in appellant's brief that the appellee as a state official contracted to use his influence as such to locate
a highway at.a certain place, the court would undoubtedly have declared
the contract void as against public policy. Gordon v. Gordon's Adm'r,
168 Ky. 409, 182 S. W. 220, L. R. A. 1916D 576; Lucas v. Allen, 80 Ky.
681, 4 Ky. Law *Rep. 687; Allison v. Dodge, 287 Fed. 621; Slpauhing v.
Maillet, 57 Mont. 318, 188 Pac. 377; Bryant Lumber Co. v. FourcheRiver
Lumber Co., 124 Ark. 313, 187 S. W. 455; Robinson v. Patterson, 71
Mich. 181, 39 N. W. 21. A state official cannot sell his influence to the
public for such purposes. But there is nothing in the contract which
suggestp that he was employed for the purpose of using his influence.
On the other hand the contract shows clearly that he was employed to
represent P in a legal capacity. This contract did not bind either
plaintiff or P to do anything opposed to the public policy of the state,
and the consideration expressed therein is not against the public policy
of the state, and there is nothing in the contract which indicates a
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tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public "good. The
court was clearly correct In holding that the mere fact that plaintiff
was a state senator was insufficient to render the contract void as
R. R. R.
against public policy.
0moNWFALTHS HAS wO VEsTrD RIGHTS m
LAW--C
CoNsTrrU TLO
ESCHEATED PROPERTY WHICH WILL PREVENT THE LEGISLATURE imoi
DETERinING THE POLrrICAL SUBDIVISION 'TO WHIC rT S].n. Go.-The

Attorney-General brought escheat proceedings against a bank ?nd after
an adverse decision in the state court, the bank appealed the case to
the Upited States Supreme Court. While this suit was pending a compromise was reached, by which money was paid into the state treasury,
also a statute was passed, section 3587b-22, providing that property
which should escheat to' the state in any district should vest In the
school oard, of that district, 'for the use and benefit of the public
schools. The board of education of the city brought this action, to
recover the money paid to the state under the circumstances stated.
Held: The legislature had the absolute power to dispose of escheated
property. Shanks, Auditor v. The Beard of Education'of the City of
Winclestefl 221 Ky. 470, 298 S. W. 1111.
bection 192 of the Kentucky Constitution and sectlsn 567 Kentucky
Statutes give the state the right to take realty by eschdat from any
corporation which holds it more thai five years, provided such property is not, "proper and necessary. for darrying on its legitimate business."
Although the wotd "escheat" as here used is not 'in strict conformity with the common law meaffing, it represents a power which
has been recognized since the days of Justinian, a power Which AngloSaxon jurisprudence has completely accorded the state 'as the original
and ultimate owner of all property within its jurisdiction. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary-Escheat. The legislature cannot impair the vested
rights of private citizens. Cooley--Constitutional Limitations, page
745-760; Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491. Yet it muit be
admitted that escheated property is subject to the control of the law
making power and therefore the state has no vested rights in it beyond
the reach of the legislature. Commonwealth v. Thomas Admr'a, 140
Ky. 798, 131 S. W. 797. Since the Kentucky Constitution makes no'
provision for dealing with escheated property, this. power in the legislature Is absolute.
The Kentucky court has held that neither the institution of escheat
proceedings, nor the mere witholding of property contrary to these
provislond, ipso facto works an escheat. But there must le a final judgment declaring escheat. Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 824,
107 S. W. 247.
The power to provide for forfeitures and penalties rests in the
legislative branch of our government, but the power to inflict them
belongs to the judiciary. Marshal v. McDanide, 12 Bush 378.
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In the instant case, the court followed the rule laid down in the
above mentioned cases, and since no final judgment had been entered
when the above statute was passed the land had not escheated. It
therefore came within the purview of the statute and must be governed
by its provisions.
J. C. B.
CoNSTXTUTONAL

LAW-WHERE

JusTioFs

EEs

AND

CosTS

WERE

DEPENDENT ON CoNvIoTIox, DEFENDANT HELD TO HAvE BEEN DEnmo DuE
Paocss OF LAw.-The appellant was arrested upon a warrant charging
him with obstructing a public highway. Upon trial before a justice
of the peace, the appellee, and a jury, the appellant filed his affidavit
in which he stated he could not get a fair and impartial trial. In
support of his motion that the justice vacate the bench, the appellant
stated that the appellee was pecuniarily interested in the case and
would receive a portion of the fine as well as costs in case of conviction.
The appellee refused to vacate the bench and the appellant was found
guilty and fined ten dollars. The appellee entered judgment for ten
dollars and twenty dollars and eighty cents costs. Of this amount the
appellee received six dollars. The appellant filed his bill seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of that judgment. Held, that a demurrer to
the bill setting forth these facts should be overruled and upon proper
proof the relief asked should be granted. Wagers v. Sizemore et aL.,
222 Ky. 306, 300 S. W. 918.
The Court of Appeals followed the decision of Tumey v. State of
Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749, 50 A. L. R. 1243, which
held invalid a statute of that state making the compensation of inferior
judges depend upon the conviction of the defendant under trial. The
basis of that decision was that such a system was violative of the Constitutional provision prohibiting the states from depriving "any person
of life, liberty, or property without dVe process of law." United States
Constitution, Amendment XIV. The court said "A system by which an
inferior judge is' paid' for his services only when he. convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice,
either at common law or in this ,country, that it can be regarded as due
process of law, unless the costs 6ually imposed are so small that they
may be properly Ignored as within the maxin" 'De minimus non curat
lex.'" The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the facts of the
principal case did not bring it within the exception quoted.
It seems that the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Tumey v. Ohio, supra, that such a practice is not "due process" is well
sustained. Lord Coke said that even Parliament could not confer upon
an individual the right of being a judge of his own case, and for that
reason an act regulating the practice of medicine was void because it
was "against common right and reason." Bonham's Case, (1610) S
Coke 113 b, 77 Eng. Reprint 646. Lord Holt also affirmed the judgment
of Lord Coke that an act which makes a person both a party and a
Judge Is the same thing as to make him a judge of his own cause and
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for that reason void. London v. Wood, (1702) 12 Mod. 669, 88 Eng.
Reprint 1592. Though these cases were criticised and overruled by
the later English decisions, it does not appear that they were overruled
upon the doctrine here considered but rather upon the right of Parliament to change the common law. 40 Harvard Law Review 30.
At the time the Tumey Case was decided this practice was said to
exist in Arkansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio,
and Texas. It also seemed to have prevailed at one time in Indiana,
Oregon, Illinois, -and Alabama. In the other states than those mentioned the inferior courts were paid for their services by the state and
C. P. R.
county regardless of acquittal or conviction.
COVENANTS-WHERE

DEED

CONTAINED

ONLY

COVENANT

OF SPEOTA

WARRANTY, No Orux WARANTY Courii Bn ImPL=.-A conveyed "to B
and her children," B conveyed to D the mineral rights and privileges.
D in exchange of lands, mineral rights and privileges conveyed to P
with a covenant of special warranty as had there-to-fore been agreed
upon by D and P. After D had conveyed to P, B died. P had started
to mine the coal when the children of B protested under claim of title
and brought an action against P in which this court held: That B had
received from A only a life estate, that the remainder in fee was vested
in the children of B and that upon the termination of B's life 6state
P's interest also terminated. P in the present action tried to recover
from D upon the covenant of special warranty and attempted to show
an implied warranty which would render L liable under the present
state of facts. Held for D, defendant. Kentucky River Coal Corp. v.
Swift Coal d Timber Go., 221 Ky. 593, 299 S. W. 201.
The rule has been handed down to us from the English courts and
still followed in that country, that a covenant of special wari-anty is to
protect the lessee against a claim of title from the lessor, but not
against a claim under title against the lessor. Stanley v. Hayes, 3 Q. B.
105. Kentucky has adopted the rule both by statute and precedent.
It is provided by section 493 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes that a covenant of special warranty in a deed shall have the same effect "as if the
grantor had covenanted that he, or his heirs and personal representatives, would forever 'warrant and defend the said property unto the
granted, his heirs, personal representatives and assigns, against the
claims and of the grantor and all persons claiming or to claim by,
through, or under him."
It has been held by Kentucky courts that by a covenant of special
warranty the grantor undertakes to say no more than that he has legal
title against the Commonwealth but refuses to guarantee that there
is no adverse claim superior to his. Arnold v. Maiden, 5 Ky. Law
Reports 334. No other covenants of warranty were implied. It has
been held that there can be no implied covenant as to a matter specifically covered by express warranty in the instrument. Kackelmacker v.
Laird, 92 Ohio State 324, 110 N. E. 933. It has also been held that im-
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plied covenants are operative only when the parties have omitted to
Insert covenants in the instrument. Weems v. McCoughan, 7 S. & M.
(Mis.) 422, 45 Am. Dec. 314. In the case at hand it was distinctly
understood 'that there were to be covenants of special warranty and
that each should have tie 1rivilege of examining the titles of the other
lefore accepting any piece,of property in the exchange which was to
contain a covenant of special warranty. There was no fraud, but
rather a mistake on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff in interpreting, "to B and her children." The holding seems to be in accord
with the weight of authority and is certainly consistent with the statute
above mentioned and with 9ther cases previously decided in Kentucky.
R. B. B.
LAw-ONE CHARGED WITH LIQUOn VIoLATIoN MAY Go BnCsRmmaN
HIND SnAR0H WARRNT TO SHoW THAT KNOWLEDGE or FAcTs STATED xN
AFID.AviT WAS OTAiNED Y ILLEGAL § FRcH.-A policeman entered the
defendant's store for the, pxpressed purpose of borrowing a hatchet.
After procuring the 'hatchet the policeman went through the door into
one of the vacant rooms without the defendant's knowledge or consent,
and found a quantity of home brew. Instead of arresting the defendant at once, the policeman went before a notaiy and made an affidavit
that he,"while standing in the building saw liquor upon the premises."
Upon this affidavit the policeman obtained~u search warrant and went
back to the premises and found the, home brew. Held, that the defendant might go behind the search warrant and affidavit for the purpose of showing that knowledge of facts stated In the affidavit was
obtained. by illegal search. White v. Commonwealth, for Use and Benefit of the City of Middesboro, 221 Ky. 535, 299 S. W. 168.
A substantially similar case had been decided differently by the
same court some three years earlier in Reitzel v. Commonwea7th, 203
Ky. 186, 261 S. W. 1106. ,Inthe earlier casb the court based its decision
upon the rule that a defendant cannot go behind a search warrant
regular and sufficient on its face to iiquire whether facts stated in the
affidavit for the warrant are true. In this later case the court professes to follow the same. rule but states that the rule does not preclude
a'showing that knowledge of facts stated in the affidavit was obtained
by' illegal search. However the court does not seem to feel sure that
the two cases are wholly reconcilable, for in this later case it says:
"To the extent that. ReitzeZ v. Commonwealth announces a contrary
doctrine, it is hereby overruled." Nevertheless It is submitted that the
two cases are clearly distinguishable. The affidavit in the earlier case
stated an -untruth whereas the affidavit in this later case states a halftruth. The difference in the facts invokes the distinction so often made
between the admissiblity of contradictory evidence and explanatory
evidence in analogous cases. In the earlier case the officer m;.de affidavit that "while standing on side-walk immediately in front of the
premises, he smelled unmistakable odors and fumes" of liquor coming
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from the defendant's place. As a matter of fact he looked through a
hole in the back fence and obtained his information. In this later
case the officer states that "while standing in the building" he saw
liquor. This statement is true as far as it goes, but it fails to state
that the officer obtained this standing place in the building by a legal
entrance. In the earlier case the method of obtaining the information
necessarily involved the truth of the facts stated in the affidavit; in
this later case the method of obtaining the information merely explains
and enlarges upon 'the facts stated in the affidavit. The two cases are
distinguishable on this ground.
It is clear that the motivating factor in the case at hand is the
Kentucky rule as to admissability of evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure. This is obvious from the following sentence quoted from
the opinion: "Manifestly, it is just as unlawful for an officer to make
an illegal search of one's premises for the purpose of acquiring information of facts on which to base an affidavit as it is to make an illegal
search for the purpose of obtaining evidence on which to base a conviction." The Kentucky court invariably has held that evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible. Neal v. Comimonwealth, 203 Ky. 353, 262 S. W. 287. There are more than fifty Kentucky cases cited In the following annotations on the subject: 24 A. L.
R. 1408; 32 A. L. R. 408; 41 A. L. R. 1145; 52 A. L. R. 477.
The rule that such evidence is inadmissible is not the majority
rule, however. Only sixteen states favor inadmissability, whereas
twenty-eight favor admissability, accoiding to an extremely interesting
summary published in the last issue of Case and Comment, volume 34,
page 8. The federal courts, headed by the Supreme Court, hold such
evidence inadmissable, as do Kentucky and the other fifteen states
favoring the minority view. Indeed the tendency would seem to be
toward the Kentucky rule because only one of thE states favoring admissability has changed from an originally contrary view, while of the
sixteen states favoring inadmissability only six of them were originally
of that view. Nevertheless the mandates of both logic and law enforcement would appear to favor the majority rule, as Professor Harno has
pointed out in 19 Illinois Law Review 303. At best the present case
appears to be an unnecessary extension of an already doubtful rule.
G. R.
DEDIcATio--"DEDIcATIoN"

IS DEVOTION OF LAND TO PUBLIC USE, IN-

CLUDING USE FOR PUBLrC HbonwA.-Plaintiff,

a firm of contractors,

seeks to recover the cost of improvements of a street in the city of Lexington, duly authorized by said city, from the defendants, alleged owners of property abutting on said street, in the amount assessed by the
city. Defendants refused to pay on the ground that they were not abutting property owners as there was a strip of land six feet wide to
which another had title, between their property and the improved
street. The question at issue was whether this six-foot strip had been
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dedicated to the, public use as a highway, or not. Prior to 1900, the
plot of ground including the street and the defendants' lot was sold to
a company which divided it up in smaller parcels and made a plat
which it filed for record in the office of the county clerk. This plat
did not show the street in question. A parcel of this land consisting
of fifteen acres and containing the streot, 'strip and lot ia question came
by mesne d6nveyance to another land company and later the whole
propprty was annexed by legal means to the city of Lexington. Before
1900 a strip of land 66 feet wide had been fenced off, including the
street and strip, but the plat filed by the last mentioned land company
expressly reserved the six foot strip which it later conveyed to the present holder of the title. The evidence does not disclose who fenced in the
sixty-six foot street, or that the then owner dedicated the strip to the
use of the public, but the court presumes that the strip was dedicated
from the fact- that it was, included in the land instead to be used ap a
street which was first accepted by the county and later annexed and
improved by the city and concludes that the street was fenced off before
the conveyance of the strip. Held; that judgment for the defendant
should be'reversed and judgment entered as prayed for in the petition.
W. T. (Jongleton & Co. v. Roberts et aL, 221 Ky. 712, 299 S. W. 579.
From the report there is nothing to show who was the owner of the
six foot strip of land in question at the time the street was fenced off
and the qnly written evidence available was the deeds and plats. The
street is not shown on the first plat and in the second it is expressly
reserved from thib street. Just who built the fence to open the road is
not disclosed, or that these persons had title to the land so opened is
also unknown, as stated in the opinion. To quote further, "Whether
dedication of land to pubic use is made expressly, or by acts and conduct, intention to dedicate it must -be clearly evidenced." Here the
continued use of the property as a public road, the acceptance of it as
shown by the county and city in repairing and keeping it up for a long
term of years without objection from the owner, create a presumption
of dedication. The dedication may be shown by the silence of the
owner in face of known adverse possession by the public, or by any
other act or omission from which the intention to dedicate may fairly
be inferred. Snouffer v. Cedar Rapids & M. City Ry Co., (1902), 118 Ia.
287, 92 N. W. 79. "When a landowner permits the general public to
use a way over the land as a highway*for a great length of time under
a notorious claim of right, the law raises a conclusive presumption of
dedication to the public use." Riley v. Buchanan, (1903), 116 Ky. 625,
G. L. B.
3 Ann. Cases 788.
DEDIOATION-EVIDENCE HELD TO SHow ORAL DEDIcATION OF A LOT AS
PART OF A STREV IN SuPI)vxsIoN.-Plaintiff asserts title to a small plot
of ground within the city and seeks to enjoin the municipality from
going upon and improving the lot as a city street. Evidence disclosed
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that plaintiff's predecessor in title had caused a lot on a plat -f a subdivision then just outside the town limits to be opened and used as a
street as a matter of convenience. This was used by the public for
more than twenty years as a street and was taken over and improved
by the city at a later time. Sidewalks were laid and sewers installed.
It was also shown that the use of the said lot saved plaintiff's predecessor a large sum of 'money as it was necessary for him to have a convenient outlet for his subdivision and that if this lot had not been used,
he would have been compelled to buy other property at great expense,
Which was the Incentive for the dedication of the land in question.
Held, that this was a plain case of oral dedication by appellant's predecessor In title for purposes of his own, and that such acts by the city
and public through a period of more than twenty years as were shown
by the evidence were undeniably equivalent to an acceptance. Central
Land Co. v. Central City, 222 Ky. 103, 300 S. W. 362.
"An intention to dedicate property to a public use must be clearly
established, but such an intention may be shown by words, by deed, or
by acts." Cole et al. v. Minnesota Loan, etc., Co. et al., 17 N. D. 409. In
the principal case the plaintiff tried to show that the city had accepted
taxes on the lot in question and was therefore estopped from claiming
title, but this contention was not supported by the evidence. While(
the lot in question did not appear on the plat filed as a street, the user
by the public fdr more than twenty years and the taking over by the
city with the improvements made, clearly showed a common law dedication by the owner and acceptance by the city. Once the street was
dedicated and accepted, it became an appurtenance of all of the lots of
the subdivision when these were sold and there was a complete and
irrevocable dedication of the street, not only to the purchasers, but
also to the public. Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Monroe 232, Schneider v.
Jacob, 86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350. In the federal courts it has been held
that if there has been no acceptance by the public of the dedication and
no interest acquired by third persons, the dedication may be recalled
by the owner, but If there has been such acceptance or if contracts have
been made founded on such public appropriation, by third parties, the
dedication becomes irrevocable. Grogan v. Hayward, 4 Fed. 161, 6
Sawy. 498. This doctrine is followed everywhere.
G. L. B.

EJECTMENT-PLAINTIFF IN EJECTMENT MUST TRAcE TrrLE BAcK To
COmmONwEALTH OR SHOW ADVERSE PossassioN FOR THE STATUTOaY
PRIOM.-The plaintiff upon her failure to trace title back to the commonwealth, undertook to take advantage of the fact that the defendant,
who was in possession, did not establish or try to establish title in himself. Held for defendant. Ogle v. Cole, 221 Ky. 726, 299 S. W. 566.
The courts of Kentucky have repeatedly held that the plaintiff in
an action of ejectment must trace the title back to the commonwealth
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or show an adverse possession for the statutory period in those under
whom he claims.
To quote from a leading case: "The plaintiff in ejectment must
recover on the strength of his own title, either by showing paper title
back to the commonwealth or that he and those under whom he claims
have been in possession of the lands by a continuous adverse possession
for the statutory period next before the institution of the action."
Payne v. Edwards, 210 Ky. 417, 276 S. W. 116.
The authorities are practically all in accord. This seems to be the
most practical and most logical view in an action of ejectment. Possession gives rise to a presumption of right in the defendant and if the
plaintiff can not rebut this presumption by showing a title back to the
commonwealth in herself, or in those under whom she claims, as the
law requires, then her cause should fail and the defendant should not
be required to prove his own title. Logan v. 'Williams, 160 Ky. 641, 170
S. W. 22; City and County of San Franciscov. Brown, 153 Cal. 644, 96
Pac. 281; Bursey v. Lyon, 30 App. D. C. 597; Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Wright,
56 Fla. 561, 47 So. 931; Spriggs v. Jamerson, 115 Va. 250, 78 S. E. 571.
This rule does not apply however, when the plaintiff has been in
possession and has been ousted by the defendant. The burden of
establishing title rests on the defendant. Witten v. St. Claire, 277 W.
Va. 762; Hall v. Gallemore, 138 Mo. 638; Morrison v. Holder, 414 Mass.
366; McDermitt v. Forbes, 69 W. V. 268.
R. B. B.
HomIcIDE--ALTHOUGH

DEFENDANT STARTED FIGHT, AS HE DID NOT

USE DEALY WEAioNs, NOR INTEND TO KrIL NOR KNow OF SuCH: IXTEXTION BY OTHERS, HE WAS NOT GUILTY OF AIDING IN COMMITTING HomxICIDE.-Appellant caused a fight by driving too close to the deceased.
Several of appellant's friends who happened to be on the spot at the
time engaged in a fight as well as several friends of the deceased. Appellant was knocked down at the beginning of the fight when he stepped
from his car, and he testified that he did not again regain consciousness until it was over. Testimony of witnesses tended to corroborate
his contention. Held, that if it should be admitted that appellant
started the fight, using no deadly weapons, and without any intention
on his part to bring about the bloody tragedy or without any knowledge
on his part that any of the others participating with him had any such
Intention, it could not be said that he was aiding or abetting in the
commission of the felony and the jury should have been so instructed.
Warren v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 460, 1 S. W. (2d.) 774.
It has been held repeatedly in Kentucky, that a person can not be
convicted as an aider and abettor in a felony, unless at the time he
participated, he knew of the felonious intentions of his accomplices,
and with that knowledge aided and abetted them or himself had such
intention. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 663, 237 S. W. 45;
Bradley v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 663, 257 S. W. 11; Powers v. Cor-
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monwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735, 63 S. W. 976, 53 L. R. A. 245;
Omer v. Commonwealth, 995 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. 594. In the latter case,
it was held prejudicial error on the -part of the court to instruct that
defendant could be convicted if he had knowledge of the killing, while
in the presence of the party who did the killing.
It has been held that mere presence and participation in the act
of killing are not conclusive evidence of consent and concurrence in
the perpetration of the act. Brooks v. State, 128 Ga. 261, 57 S. E. 483,
12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 889. Where a homicide is committed by a third
person growing out of an altercation between accused and deceased,
-unless there is some conspiracy or previous design to kill between accused and such third person, the accused is not guilty of felonious
homicide. People v. Elder, 100 Mich. 515, 59 N. W. 237; Tuner v.
State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 So. 54; Abata v. State (Texas Crim. App.) 102 S.
W. 1125.
Criminal responsibility for acts of others done in the prosecution
of an unlawful project is subject to the limitation that the particular
act of one of a party, for which the associates and confederates are to
be held liable, must be shown to have been done for the furtherance or
in prosecution of the common object and design for which they combined together. Williams v. State, 81 Ala. 1, 1 So. Rep. 179; Powers v.
Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735; People v. Friedman, 205 N.
Y. 161, 98 N. E. 471, 45 L. R. A. (N. -S.) 55.
Under the law as given in the court's holding in the present case,
appellant was undoubtedly innocent of criminal homicide. It is submitted by the court that admitting the appellant started the fight, yet
if he had not intended to commit felony or that he had knowledge of
any such intent by those participating, he should not be held guilty.
The evidence would tend to show that appellant, although he was the
cause of the fight, did not start it; but was knocked down and remained unconscious throughout. He was entirely innocent of what
was taking place and in the light of the evidence it was clearly error
on the part of the trial court in refusing the instructions asked.
H. C. C.
INSURANCE-POLICY COVERING TOTAL ILLNESS DISABILITY, PREVENTING ASSURED FRom PERFORMING DuTEs PERTAINING TO "His OccupATION," PRECLUDED CREDIT FOR EARNINGS IN ANOTHER BUSINESS WHILE
so DIsABLED.-Defendant insurance company issued plaintiff a policy
insuring him against "Total illness disability that continuously prevents the assured . . . from performing each and every duty pertaining to his occupation." His occupation was that of retail groceryman. During the term of the policy he developed tuberculosis. He
sold his store and quit business, as his health was such that he was
unable to perform the duties pertaining to his occupation. For four
_years he lived on a farm doing nothing. The company paid him for
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total disability for these four years. He then moved to town and the
compaiiy refused to pay him any longer. Thereupon plaintiff brought
this action.. Defendant company claimed that for sometime plaintiff
bad been engaged in other business than that of a groceryman and
asked that if it were held liable, it be given credit for amounts earned
by the plaintiff. Evidence showed plaintiff's total inability to carry
on the business of retail groceryman, but there was some evidence
tending to show he could to some extent carry on the business of buying and selling real estate. Held: That the policy insured him
against disability to perform duties pertaining to the occupation of
retail groceryman only, so that insurer was not entitled to credit for
amounts earned in another business while disabled to follow stated
occupation. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Bynum, 221 Ky.
450, 298 S. W. 1080.
The principal case turned on whether under the policy the defendant insurance company insured plaintiff against total disability to
carry on the business of a retail groceryman or whether it only insured him against total disability to carry on any business in which he
might be engaged during the time sued for. In National Life & Accident Insurance Company. v. O'Brien, 155 Ky. 498, 155 S. W. 1134, the
insurance was of a disability which prevented the. insured from performing every duty pertaining ,to any business or occupation. In
Hagman v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 214 Ky. 56, 282 S. W.
1112, the disability insured against existed if the insured was permanently unable to engagq in any occupation or perform any work
for compensation of financial value. There are many like cases, in all
of which it has been held that the thing insured against was a disi
ability to work in any occupation. Bellows v. Travelers Insurance
Company, 203 S. W. (Mo.) 978; Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Company,
94 Vt. 383, 111 Atl. 449.
There are no such provisions in the policy in the principal case.
In this policy the thing insured against is total illness disability that
continuously prevents the assured from performing each and every
duty pertaining to his occupation. His occupation is stated to be that
of a retail groceryman. So that by the very terms of the policy the
disability insured against is a disability to perform each and every
diaty pertaining to his occupation as a retail groceryman. A thorough
search of the books has failed to reveal any case on all fours with the
one at hand. The question whether there is a total disability when the
insured, notwithstanding his injury or disease, is able to work in other
occupations, depends largely on the terms of the contract defining the
disability. It is aubmitted that the wording of the policy Is conclusive
that the defendant insured plaintiff against disability to perform duties
pertaining to the occupation ok retail groceryman only and that the
court correctly held that defendant was not entitled to credit for
amounts earned by plaintiff in another business.
R. R. R.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-LANDLED is LIABL FOB DAMAGES PRODUCED
BY LATENT DEFEcTs, KNowN To Him, BUT UNKNOWN TO TEnANT.-Appellee lived with her husband in their apartment which they rented of
the appdllant in his tenement house. There was no water in their
apartment but appellant had provided a washroom In the rear thereof
from which appellees got their water. There was a sink and a water
pipe in the washroom, running up through the floor from the ground,
about three and a half feet above, the surface. Above this, the pipe
which led to a boiler, had been disconnected and a wooden plug Inserted. The weather being extremely cold the faucet froze although
the water was turned off from the pipe. When appellee turned the
water on by means of the wrench so provided, the faucet being frozen
increased the pressure and forced the plug out of the pipe, which struck
the appellee and injured her severely. Held: If latent and hidden
defects existed as to the property which were knoWn to or could have
been known to the landlord through the exercise of ordinary care, and
which were unknown to the tenant, then the lessor would be liable for
apy damages produced thereby. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Zaris, 222
Ky. 23 , 300 S. W. 615.
The law imposes a liability where the landlord refeases the entire
possession to the renter and does not re-enter, but the premises were
iA a defective or dangerous condition when leased; this fact being
known to the lessor, and not known to nor reasonably discoverable by
the'lessee, the former concealing the true condition from thp latter.
56 Central Law Journal 226. The rule has most frequently been applied
to defects In portions of the premises which the tenant would not be
likely to and did not dlscover; to cases of defective sidewalks, Lay,decker v. Brintnal, 158 Mass., 381, 33 .N. E. 399; vaults, Coke v. Gutkese, 80 Ky. 598; Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381, 29 N. E. 591; and
cesspools, Cowen V. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N. B. 591, because
while no responsibility arises out of a contract expresd or implied there
is a strict common law liability for a tort, in using the property ih a
harmful way, and an application is made of the maxim sio utere to in
alienum non laedas. Ker v. Myell, 80 Mich., 528, 8 L. R. A. 682, 45 N.
W. 587. The owner of the premises upon which is situated a structur
or building dangerous in its condition, and which is known to the
owner cannot escape liability to a tenant from whom he conceals such
defect or a member of his family, who, not knowing of such defect,
and while in the exercise of ordinary care, is injured by the falling of
such building or structure, Moore v. Parkes, 63 Kas. 52, 53 L. R. A. 778.
The question arises whether the landlord must actually know of the
defects and dangerous conditions existing" when he leases the premises.
The better rule is that his knowledge may be actual or constructive,
and the latter arlses'where he fails to make reasonable Investigation,
Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S. W. 914, 34 L. R. A. 824.
Where there was an injury to the tenant's daughter and it appeared
that the landlord knew of the dangerous condition of a portion of the
premises which would be frequently used by the tenant and his family,
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and failed to disclose the condition to the tenant, although it was so
situated as not to be readily discernible by them, the Kentucky rule is
that -because of the failure to disclose the landlord is liable. Goke v.
H-utkese, 80 Ky. 598, 44 Am. Rep. 490.
A. K. R.
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appellant was a member of a household, which had rented premises
from the defendant. The premises, a house and yard, was one of
several tenant houses, erected for the use of the employees of the defendant mining company. The defendant had also sunk and maintained a well for the use and enjoyment of all of the tenants located
in that section of houses. The pump of the well in question was in a
defective condition and the appellant was painfully injured while using
it. She thereupon brought this action for damages. Held, that the
landlord was bound to maintain the premises retained under these
circumstances in a reasonably safe condition. Richmond v. Standard
Elkhorn Coal Co. 222 Ky. 150, 300 S. W. 359.
A distinction is made as to the landlord's duty of maintaining the
premises when the tenant has the exclusive possession, Franklin v.
Tracy, 117 Ky. 267, 77 S. W. 1112; and where the landlord retains a
portion of the premises demised for the common use and benefit of
other tenants occupying separate premises. In the latter instance the
law imposes upon him the duty of maintaining the premises in a
reasonably safe condition and if he is negligent in this respect and
injury results to the tenant therefrom, he is liable. Looney v. McLean,
129 Mass. 33, 37 Am. Rep. 295. The reason of relieving the landlord in
the former instance e. g. when the tenant has the exclusive possession
is that he would be guilty of a trespass should he enter for the purpose
of making repairs. Greenm 'v. Hammock, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 145, 16 S. W.
357. By reason of this the tenant is relieved of any duty to the landlord and his agents the same as he is to any other trespassers, and if
the landlord sends his agent on the premises to repair the same and he
is injured while thus engaged, he cannot recover from the tenant.
J.
D. Forsythe v. Shryock-Thom Grocery Co., 283 Mo. 49, 223 S. W. 39.
As the doctrine of res ipsa Zoquitur is predicated upon the idea that
the accident complained of does not happen in the usual course of
events if those who have the management of the instrumentality causing the injury use proper care, Scott v. London Dock Co., 2 H. & C. 596;
its application in this situation depends upon whether the defective
apparatus was under the exclusive control' of the landlord, Powers v.
Rex Coal Co. et at 207 Ky. 761, 270 S. W. 28, or whether the control was
shared by both the landlord and the tenant, White v. Spreckles, 10 Cal.
App. 287, 101 Pac. 920, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 29.
The rule of the principal case establishing the landlord's liability
for injuries to the tenant, arising from the maintenance of defective
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apparatus Installed for the enjoyment of several tenants, is in accord
with that which prevails in the majority of jurisdictions. Indianapolis
Abattoir Co. v. Temperly, 159 Ind. 651, 95 Am. St. Rep. 330, 64 N. E. 906;
Queeney v. Willi, 225 N. Y. 374, 122 N. E. 198; Tiffany Real Property,
section 51.
C. P. R.

Lin.
DONS OFcE

AND SLAN Enn-FxsE CHnmGE- To EFFECT THAT JuDGE ABAa.AN
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LBELouS.-The ap-

pellants published in newspapers having a wide circulation throughout
the state statements to the effect that in a noted rape case the judge
was busying himself with the prosecution, that the defendants were
tobe swiftly convicted and hanged regardless of the circumstances, that
they were being rushed to the gallows by a farcial trial, that the judge's
trial was an exercise of mob law, and that'he had not given a thought
to the presumption of innocence that the law throws around the accused. Held, such charges are charges of a want of integrity on the
part of the trial judge, and are therefore libelous. Cole v. Commao
-wealth, Warley v. "Same, Louisville News Co. v. Hamte. 222 Ky. 350,
300 S. W. 907.
The interest of society requires that immunity should be granted
to the discussion of public affairs and that all acts and matters of a
public nature may be freely discussed with fittlng comments or strictures. Democratic Publishing Co. v. Harvey, 181 Ky. 730, 205 W. S.
903. It has been held that fair comment on such matters is a public
right Van Lankhuyzen v. DailiNews Co. 203 Mich. 570, 170 N. W. 93.
Individuals have this right the same as newspapers and publishers.
Patten v. Harper's Weekly Corp. 93 Misc. 368, 158 N. Y. S. 70. On the
other hand, newspapers have no special privilege. Morse v. TimesRepublican Printing Co. 124 Ia. 707, 100 N. W. 867; Williams v. Beach,
24 S. D. 501, 124 N. W. 728.
The recognition of the right to publish proceedings of the courts of
justice Is of modern growth. McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 28 Am. R.
465;American Publishing Co. v. Gamble, i15 Tenn. 663, 90 S. W. 1005;
Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73. Both at common law, Lee v. Brooklyn Union Publishing Co. 209 N. Y. 245, 103 N. E. 155 and in most
jurisdictions by statute a full, fair and impartial report Is qualifiedly
privileged. Conklin v. Augusta Pub. Co. 276 Fed. 288.
While Kentucky has no statute as above it is held that newspapers
are not held to exact facts, and truth constitutes a complete defense,
although the publication was inspired by malice, and although the
report contains matter that would otherwise be defamatory and actionable. Plummer v. Commercial Tribune Co. 208 Ky. 215, 270 S. W. 793.
Where one exercises the citizen's right to denounce the action of a
public officer it is unlawful for him to make a false and malicious
charge of crime or misdemeanor in office. Rowland v. De Camip, 96
Pa. 493.
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An article in a newspaper charging a public officer with gross misconduct in office is not privileged on, the ground of its publication being
a public good. Boureseau v. Detroit Evening Journal, 63 Mich. 425, 30
N. W. 376, 6 Am. St. Rep. 320. A newspaper proprietor has no greater
right to comment on the conduct of a public officer than an individual,
so held in Gazette Co. v. Bishop, 6 Ohio, Dec. 1113.
Thus it is seen that by both the common law and by statute accurate and just criticism of public officers is protected, but such criticism
A. K. R.
must be founded on truth.
LnurTAToNs OF AcTIoNs-AcTION BY MARIuE WomAN FoR PER ONAL
INJURIEs SUSTAINED .AFTER MAREIAG HELD NOT BARRED BY ONE YEAR
STATUTE OF LInTATIoiqS.-Appellant was riding as a passenger in an
automobile, when the defendant negligently and carelessly ran its
wagon and team into the automobile in which she was riding thereby
injuring her. Appellant was a married woman. This action having
been brought more than one year after the accident occurred, defendant pleads the one year statute of limitation under section 2516 of the
Kentucky Statutes. Held, that the action was not barred by section
2516 of the Kentucky Statutes, in view of section 2525, since, being
under disability, she could bring it at any time within one year
after removal of such disability. Dowell v. Gray Von Allman Sanitary
Milk Co., 221 Ky. 780, 299 S. W. 956.
This same question was before the court in City of Ludlow v.
Gorth, 214 Ky. 833, 284 S. W. 84, which was also an action for personal
Injury. The court held, that since the plaintiff was laboring under a
disability, being a married woman, she was, therefore, entitled to bring
her action at any time within one year after the removal of her disability. An action for damages to the property of a married woman
sustained by her by the operation of railroad trains on the street in
front of her property is not barred until the lapse of five years after
she becomes discovert. Onions v. Covington & Cincinnati El. R. R. Co.,
107 Ky. 154, 53 S. W. 8. The statute of limitations does not run against
a married woman during coverture. This is clearly the law in Kentucky as indicated by the following cases: Peters v. Noble, 196 Ky.
123, 244 S. W. 416;,ullivan v. Bland, 215 Ky. 57, 284 S. W. 410;D76van
v. Parepoint,et al. 168 Ky. 11, 181 S. W. 653; Dukes v. Davis, 125 Ky.
313, 101 S. W. 390;Sturgill v. C. & 0. R y., 116 Ky. 659, 76 S. W. 826;
Henson, et al v. Cuip, 157 Ky. 442, 163 S. W. 455; Smith v. Cox's Conmittee, 156 Ky. 118, 160 S. W. 786.
We find courts in other jurisdictions holding in accord with the
principal case. Statutes enlarging the rights of married women have
been held not to repeal by implicabion exceptions in their favor in the
Statutes of Limitations. Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo.
61, 43 S. W. 368; Carey v. Paterson, 47 N. J. L. 365, 1 Atl. 473; Memphis
4 L. R. R. Co. v. Organ, 67 Ark. 84, 55 S. W. 952.
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In many jurisdistions where acts have been passed removing the
disabilities of married women a contrary result has been reached. In
Hayward v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 395, the court said: "The act of 1861, In vesting married women with the sole control of their separate property,
'was, as to such property, to place them in precisely the same position,
so far as the statutes of limitations are concerned, that they would
occupy as femes sole. When the reason ceases, the law ceases. The
exception in fayor of married women, in the old statutes of limitations,
was because of their disability to sue without the consent of their husbands and the joining of their names. That being removed 'by this
act, a married woman should be held to the same promptness, in the
assertion of her rights, as any other property holder laboring under no
legal disability." Coveture is no longer a legal disability ifi New York.
Acker v. Acker et aL, 81 N. Y. 143. Coveture as a disability has been
entirely destroyed by statute and no longer exists as a bar to any
statute of limitations. Butter v. Bell, 181 N. C. 85, 106 S. E. 217; Nissley v. Brubaker, 192 Pa. 388, 43 Atl. 967; Douglass v. Douglass, 72 Mich.
86, 40 N. W. 177. Coveture is no longer a full legal disability under
the existing statutes of Indiana. Rosa v. Prather,103 Ind. 191, 2 N.
E. 575. The statute of limitations runs against a married woman in
all actions to which her husband is not a necessary party plaintiff with
her. Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447, 95 Am. Dec. 194.
In Percy v. Uockrifl, 53 Fed. 872, the federal court was governed by
Arkansas decisions applying the ArkaAsas statute. It would seem that
the federal courts follow the decisions of the highest judicial tribunal
of thQ state enacting such statutes.
On the question presented, whether statutes eilarging- the rights of
married women, which includes the so-called Married Women's Acts,
conferring on married women certain rights of property and of action,
have repealed by implication the exception commonly found in Statutes
of Limitations in their favor, the authorities are in hopeless conflict,
due in part to differences in statutes, but chiefly, it appears, to differences as to the interpretation and purpose of the exception in the
Statutes of Limitations in favor of married women. It seems there is
a clear trend in recent decisions by a majority of the jurisdictions in
favor of doctrine of implied repeal by such statutes of the saving clause
in favor of married women in the Statutes of Limitations. Kentucky,
B. C.'
however, is in accord with the minority view.
-- EMPLOYER HELD NOr LmAr- FOR EwPLoym s
MASTa AwD SEaVA
NEGLIGENCE WHEN NOT DRIVING ON OwN ERRAND NOTWITHSTANDING
EMPLOYEE HAD NO LIcExES-An employee of the defendant drove an
automobile, which was used for the convenience of the business, to his
home, two blocks away, intending to stop on his way back and get some
articles for the firm. He was a competent and experienced driver and
decided to drive out in the country about three miles and get an acquaintance. After he had gone about two miles the accident occured
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for which the defendant is sued. Held: The employee was not within
the scope of his employment and defendant is not liable. (Ky. St.
1ecs. 2729gl (c), 2729g15). Winslow v. Everson, 221, Ky. 430, 298 S.
W. 1084.
In the absence of a statute this case would fall within the clearly
defined principle of agency, which the courts have followed almost
universally, that a principal is not liable for acts of his agent done
without the scope of his employment. Eakins v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 1,
183 S. W. 217; Wyatt v. Hodson, 210 Ky. 47, 275 S.'W. 47; Slater v.
Advance Thresher Co., 97 Minn., 305, 107 N. W. 133; Stewart v. Barauch,
93 N. Y. S. 161, 103 App. Div. 577.
Ky. Statutes Sec. 2739g15 says, "before any chauffeur shall operate
or drive an automobile on the highway" or before any perkon or firm
shall hire him he must have a chauffeur's license. Section 2729gi (c)
defines a chauffeur as, "one whose business or occupation, in whole or
i n part, is the operation of an automobile for, compensation, wages, or
hire." Under these statutes it was contended that the defendant was
committing a misdemeanor by knowingly allowing the employee to drive
his automobile without a license and should therefore be held liable
even though the employee was not acting within the scope of his employ.ment at the time of the accident This contention finds support
in the doctrine, which the courts now regard as unsound and untenable, that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality per se, and
therefore should not be intrusted to one known to be incompetent, to
control it, Keck's Admr. v. The Gas and Electric Co., 179 Ky. 317;
Tyler v. Stephen's Admr, 163 Ky. 780. But even this contention Is not
applicable to this case because the employee was shown to be an experienced and competent driver. The court further concluded that the
employee was not a chauffeur within the intendment of the above
statute and therefore could not be operating an automobile contrary to
its provisions. The case then must rest upon the principle of "principal and agent" and consequently is in accord with the overwhelming
weight of authority.
J. C. B.
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PRUDENT PERSONS, IF SOBER, EXERCISE UNDER SMMIAR CIRCUMSTANCES.-

Appellee's decedent was killed by a motor truck owned and operated
by appellant while attempting to cross the railroad track upon which
the truck was being operated. In an action for negligence the defense
was interposed that the decedent was intoxicated, which caused him to
be contributorily negligent. Held, that the appellant was entitled to
Instructions defining ordinary care as care which ordinarily prudent
persons, if sober, exercise under similar circumstances. Blackc Star
Coal Co. v. Blusher'&Ad'r,
221 Ky. 729, 299 S. W. 732.
The rule as laid down by the court In the instant case is of unquestioned authority in Kentucky. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Holland's
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Adm'r., 147 Ky. 699, 145 S. W. 389; Graham's Adm'r. v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 185 Ky. 370, 215 S. W. 60; L. & N. R. Go. v. Howser's Adm'r.,
201 Ky. 548, 257 S. W. 1010.
That an intoxicated person will be held to the same degree of care
which would be required of an ordinarily prudent sober person seemp
generally accepted in all jurisdictions. CJhicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v.
Bell, 70 I1. 102; Brand v. Schenectady & T. P. Co., 8 Barb. (N. Y.)1
368;Denmarn v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 26 Minn. 357, 4 N. W. 605.
However, the intoxication of the injured person of itself will not
prevent a recovefy. L. & N. R. Co. v. Cummins, 111 Ky. 333, 63 S. W.
594; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Davis, 83 Ark. 217, 103 S. W. 603.
The question to be determined Is not whether the party was intoxicated,
but whether or not he exercised ordinary care. Lawson v. Seattle & R.
R. Co., 34 Wash. 500, 76 Pac. 71, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 253.
Thus it has been held that it is rot negligence per se for an Intoxicated person to attempt to cross a railroad track. Morgan v. C. d
0. R. Go., 176 Ky. 409, 195 S. W. 809; Ward v. Chicago, St. Paul 9 M. B.
Co., 85 Wis. 601, 55 N. W. 771. It is merely a circumstance which is to
be considered in determining the question of contributory negligence.
LouiSville d N. R. Co. v. Howser's Adm'r, supra; Shelley v. Brunswick
Traction Co.; 65 N. J. Law 639, 48 Atl. 562.
The intoxication nust contribute to the injury, but all the circumstances of the case will be taken into account in so determining. Marquette, H. d- 0. R. Co. v. Hanford, 39 Mich. 537, Morgan v. C. A 0. R. Co.,
supra.
Thus,it may be said that the standard of care is always that of
the ordinarily prudent, sober man. Intoxication places an added burden upon a person to use such care, and is never an excuse or extenuating circumstance for failure to use it. But if such care is used in spite
of such intoxication, then recovery is not barred. This seems the universal rule.
W. C. S.
SPECIFIC PEaFOR
NCE-COMYrLAINANT FOR SPECIFIC PFvonlA
,C
AsINnG JUDGnENT AGAnST HUSBAND ron VAL-Un OF Wix'ns DowER on
HEu REFUSAL TO Join CoNvEYANcE HELD, STATED CAUSE O' Acmon Appellant contracted with the husband to purchase certain lots for
$2,250 cash. The husband accepted the proposition by written endorsement, but his wife never signed nor became a party to the contract.
The husband and wife had a deed prepared, but for some unknown
reason, never had it acknowledged and refused to go further, when appellant tendered payment. Thereupon appellant began his suit for
specific performance, and on final adjudication the court held, that appellant had stated a cause of action in specific performance, after alleging refusal of the vendor's wife to join in the conveyance, and by prayIng for judgment against the vendor for the value of his wife's dower
interest. Will B. Miller Company v. Bannon, 221 Ky. 677, 299 S. W. 567.
It does not appear that abatement of a wife's dower interest from
the purchase price in the specific enforcement of a contract to convey
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land in which -the wife refuses to join her husband, has been before the
Court of Appeals at any previous time. The court cites no authority.
It has been held that where the wife did not sign the contract, that
specific performance would be decreed because the vendor had sufficient
other real estate out of which dower could be assigned. Bartley v. Big
Branch Coal Co., 160 Ky. 123, 169 S. W. 601.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether abatement of the
wife's dower interest in such a case should be decreed: Sinceithe husband has not obtained his yvife's joinder in the deed, and she can not
be compelled to join, the price of her dower interest should -bededucted
from the purchase price. Voeker v. Wallingford, 133 Ia. 605, 111 N. W.
37; Wanamaker v. Brown, 77 S. C. 64, 57 S. E. 665; Martin v. Merrit, 51
Ind. 34, 26 Am. Dec. 45; Springle.v. Shield&, 17 Ala. 295. But specific
performance of a written contract to sell land In such a case will not
be decreed where fraud in the vendor is not shown In the refusal of
the wife, unless the vendee will iay the full purchase price and accept
a deed signed by the husband alone. Aiple-Hemmelmann Real Estate
Co. v. Spelbrink, 211 Mo. 671,. 111 S. W. 480, 14 Am. Case 652; Burl's
App. 75 Pa. 141, 15 Am. Rep. 587; Batem~an v. Riley, 72 N. J. Eq. 316,
73 Atl. 1006; Traylitt v: Burgh, 89 Va. 895, 21 L. R. A. 133, 37 Am. St.
Rep. 894.
The objection to an abatement of the purchase price for the wife's
dower interest, as stated by the Federal Court is, that to ascertain the
value of such contingent right of dower would necessarily involve a
controverted question of fact-a question that would likely illicit a
variety of opinion and judgment, and when determined it would not be
the agreement of the parties, but a distinct term introduced Into the
contract. To do this would be simply modifying the contract, and
decreeing specific performance as modified. Barber v. Hickey, 2 App.
Cas. (D. C.) 207, 24 L. R. A. 763.
Conceding that the terms of the contract are altered as pointed
out by the Federal Court, and the vendee still wishes to go ahead with
the contract, it does not appear that any injustice would result. It Is
the vendor's fault in not procuring his wife's consent, and the Court
of Appeals should be justified in its decision.
H. C. C.
ToRTs-PFTITIoN ALLEGING PuBLICATION OF NOI'CE RESPECTING
PLAINT)F'S INDEBTEDNESS HELD TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INvAsIOiT
OF RIGHT OF PnxvAcm.-Appellant, a garage owner, caused to be placed
upon his show window a conspicuous notice to the effect that appellee
owed him a sum of money, which he had promised to pay time and
again, and had failed to do so. Appellee brought this action, alleging
that by reason of appellant's publication of said notice he had been exposed to public contempt, rdicule, aversion, and disgrace. There was
no allegation that the matter set forth in the petition was false. Held,
that appellee stated a good cause of action in tort for unwarranted invasion of his right of privacy. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.
W. 967.
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The right of privacy, or the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity is a iew branch of the law, developed in comparatively recent years. See 4 Harvard Law Review 193. In Kentucky
the doctrine was first referred to in Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush
(Ky.) 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509. The action there was for publication of
the plaintiff's letters to his wife, then dead. Although the basis for the
decision was the violation of a property right in the letters, the doctrine
of the right of privacy was discussed in a dissenting opinion by Williams, J. Since that time there has been a development of the law in
Kentucky, leading to the decision in the instant case. In Foster-Milburn
Go. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137, the
court held the publication of a photograph without the owner's consent
to be an invasion of the right of privacy and actionable. The decision
was followed in Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849, 42 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 386, upon substantially the same facts, In both cases the
court declined to put their decision upon the violation of a property
right in the photographs.
The courts as a whole, however, are loath to accept the doctrine of
the right of privacy, adhering to the view that the legislatures and not
the courts must provide a remedy for the invasion of such a right.
Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97; Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442. These courts take the view that
the law cannot undertake to remedy a sentimental injury, and is not
concerned with the feelings of a person unless the suffering and discomfort are connected with the possession and enjoyment of property. Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285.
A number of jurisdictions have accepted the doctrine, and the
courts adhering to it recognize the existence of the rights as incident
to the person, scouting the idea of a necessity for the existence of
a property right. Pavesich v, New England L. Ins. Go., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So.
499, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147. The view is expressed that the right of
privacy is a natural right, which every human being had in his natural
state, and which he did not surrender by becoming a member of organized society. Pavesich v. New England Mutual L. Ins. Co., supra.
It is significant to note that in the instant case the rule is expressly
laid down that the allegation of the truth of the matter published constitutes no defense to an action for the invasion of the right of privacy.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the paragraph of appellant's
answer alleging truth as a defense, and this was sustained by the upper
court. Had the appellee brought his action in libel he would undoubtedly have lost, for truth is a complete defense. Kentucky Civil Code,
Section 124; Courier-JournalGo. v. Phillips,142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446.
The complete defense which truth constitutes in an action of libel is
thus made statutory in Kentucky, and thus the decision in the instant
case is an especially strong one, and establishes beyond all doubt the
existence of a right of privacy, and the determination of the Kentucky
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courts to vigilantly guard such a right. No other jurisdiction, even
W. C. S.
though recognizing the right, seems to have gone so fat.
Wmts-To CRAnTE A PRECATORY. TauST TESTATOa MUST POINT OUT
CLFARLY AND CERTAINLY Su' CTT-MATrE OF TnusT.-Appellee claimed
that testator in his lifetime had made him a: present of a certificate of
deposit in the sum of $19,200. In the settlement of the testator's estate,
it became necessary for appellee to prove his claim. As he was incompetent as a witness on the ground of Interest, he sought to prove it by
A, who had issued the certificate at the request of testator, and who was
p~resent when testator handed it to appellee with the request that appellee take care of A out of it. It was contended that A was an incompetent witness as he was interested in the outcome of the case. Held,
that A had no such interest as would disqualify him as a witness. That,
even if testator had bequeathed this certificate of deposit to appellee
with such a request that appellee look after A, the request would not
have amounted to a precatory trust. Thevathai'f Executor v. Dee's
Executors et aL, 221 Ky. 396, 298 S. W. 975.
No trust is created by precatory words when the language of the
will clearly shows none was intended. Testator's will in favor of his
wife reading that he requested the wife to arrange at her death that
any property passing to her under the will should be divided into equal
parts to be given to certain individuals with declaration that
it was only a request on his part which in no wise should be construed
as meaning that he was placing any limitations on the right of the wife,
held not to have created a precatory trust in favor of the individuals
named. Gross -v. Smart, 189 Ky. 338, 224 S. W. 871. In order to create
a precatory trust, the testator must point out with sufficient clearness
and certainty, amobig other things, the subject-matter of the Intended
trust. Wood v. Wood, 127 Ky. 514, 10Q S. W. 226. Where words are
used in a will making a request, but without intending to create a trust,
such words are held not to create a precatory trust. Enders v. Tasco,
89 Ky. 17, 11 S. W. 818; Sale v. Thornsberry, 86 Ky. 266, 5 S. W. 468;
Igo v. Irvine, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1165, 70 S. W. 836.
This same doctrine prevails in other jurisdictions. Precatory
words which follow an absolute devise are usually treated as expressions of wish rather than of will, so that no trust is created. In Hess
v. Singer, 114 Mass. 56, Judge Gray rendering the opinion of the court,
said: "In order to'create a trust, it must appear that the words were
intended by the testator to be imperative; and when property is given
absolutely and without restriction, a trust is not to be lightly imposed,
upon mere words of recommendation and confidence." This same rule
is quoted with approval in Bloom v. Strauss, 73 Ark. 56, 84 S. W. 511,
and in Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300. Precatory or commendatory
words must be essentially imperative in their character in order to
create a trust. Bristol v. Austin, 40 Conn. 438. Words in -a will expressive of desire, recommendation, and confidence are not words of
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technical but of common parlance, and are not prima facie sufficient to
convert a devise or bequest into a trust. In re Pennock, 2 Pa. St. 268,
59 Am. Dec. 718. In Bryan v. Milby, 6 Del. Ch. 208, 24 AtI. 339, testator devised his whole estate to his *ife, and requested that, if she should
not require the whole of the estate as a support, she would Yvill the
remainder at her death-to the children of the testator's brother, held,
there being no certainty as to the existence of a remainder, that ao
precatory trust arose in favor of the children. In Witntoth v. WilmotL
34 W. Va. 426, 12 S. E 731, the court held where a will gave to testator's wife all his personalty, "to be hers absolutely, to be used by her
in any way or manner she may wish for her own comfort and for the
comfort and benefit of our two children," that such words did not create
an implied or precatory trust in favor of the children.
In Post v. Mfoore, 181 NT.Y. 15, 73 N. E. 482, testator bequeathed all
of his property to his wife. A separate clause of the will stated thatit
was testator's wish and desire that his wife should pay a certain sum
of money per year to his sister, held, not to create a trust in favor of
the sipter.
The modern rule, however, seems to be, according to a majority of
the Jurisdictions, that in order to have a trust from the use of precatory words, the court must be satisfied, from the words themselves,
that the testator's intention to create an express trust is as full, complete, settled, and sure as though he had given the property to hold
upon a trust declared in the ordinary manner. There can be no doubt
that Kentucky is in accord with this, the modern rule.
B. C.

